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CASE NOTES

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TAXATION-INTERSTATE COMMERCE-CONGRESSIONAL STOP-GAP LEGISLATION
AND STATE TAXATION OF INCOME FROM
ORDER-TAKING IN ]INTERSTATE
COMMERCE
The International Shoe Company, a Delaware Corporation, has its principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri. During the period in question, the plaintiff sent its salesmen into Louisiana to solicit orders for
shoes. These orders were forwarded to St. Louis, the home office, for
acceptance or rejection. If the orders were accepted the merchandise was
shipped into Louisiana from outside the stLte. No office, warehouse or any
other place of business in Louisiana is maintained by International Shoe
Company. During the fiscal years ended November, 1959 and 1960, the
Collector of Revenue (Cocreham) levied a tax on the net income of the
plaintiff, which the plaintiff paid under protest. Subsequently, the International Shoe Company brought this suit against the Collector of Revenue
to recover the state income taxes paid. In i:he District Court of Louisiana,
a judgement was entered for the Internaticnal Shoe Company from which
the Collector appealed. The Supreme Couri: of Louisiana affirmed the opinion of the lower court. InternationalShoe Company v. Cocreham, 164 So.
2d 314 (La. 1964).'
Congress and its plenary power to regulate interstate commerce is the
salient issue in this case and will be the major subject of this case note.
State taxation of income derived from interstate commerce continues to
be an important question. Is such a tax an inordinate burden on the free
flow of trade between the states and thus a violation of the Commerce
Clause? 2 To fully appreciate and understand the treatment the United
States Courts afford this issue, it is necessary to mention briefly its
development.
The United States Supreme Court diff,-rentiates between a state tax
levied against an interstate business for the: privilege of doing business in
the state, sometimes referred to as a gross receipts or excise tax, and a state
1 164 So. 2d 314 (La. 1964), n. 3: "In this court briefs by amici curiae have been filed
on behalf of the Collector by the attorneys general of 19 states. These states are Alaska,

Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New 'Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Washington. Oth:!r amici curiae briefs have been filed
on behalf of plaintiff by forty nation-wide trade associations representing 71,105 multistate merchandisers and seventeen state manufacturers' associations."
2 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, clause 3; "The Congress ,;hall have the Power ...To regulate
commerce ... among the several States."
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tax levied on the income earned within the state from interstate operations.
Where the business is solely from interstate commerce, the Supreme Court
has held the excise or gross receipts tax to be a direct or undue burden
on the free flow of trade and thus a violation of the Commerce Clause.3
This position is most clearly stated in Spector Motor Service Inc. v.
O'Conner.4 The excise tax charged here was measured by net income and
the rates and incidents of the tax were the same as if the tax were applied
as a net income tax. However, the tax was not placed on the net income,
rather it was imposed directly on Spector Motor Service, a wholly interstate business, as an excise tax. The Supreme Court considers this to be
taxation assessed directly on interstate commerce and thus oppressive.
A state tax on the income earned from interstate business, on the other
hand, has been considered an indirect effect on interstate commerce and
thus valid. 5 Such taxation is received much more favorably since the tax
is levied on the net income of a business after the interstate transactions
have ceased." Therefore, the income tax is not an exaction on interstate
transactions but rather on the end results produced by them. Furthermore,
this type of income tax is considered to be less prohibitive than an excise
or gross receipts tax because it only occurs if the interstate transactions
are profitable.1
The Nortbwestern-Stockbams decision in 1959 marks the initiation of
the controversy culminating in the International Shoe Company case. It
3 Cf. Eastern Tennessee & Western North Carolina Transp. Co. v. Currie, 248 N.C.
560, 104 S.E.2d 403 (1958); aff'd per curiam at 359 U.S. 28 (1959). See also Wisconsin

v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940); Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1937);
Cheney Bros. Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 147 (1917); and Alpha Portland Cement
Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203 (1924).
4340 U.S. 602 (1951).
5

Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Collector of Revenue, 234 La. 651, 101 So. 2d 70

(1958); appeal dismissed 359 U.S. 28 (1958); West Publishing Co. v. McColgan, 27
Cal. 2d 705, 166 P.2d 861 (1945); aff'd per curiam 328 U.S. 823 (1946); Memphis Natural
Gas Co. v. Beeler, 315 U.S. 649 (1942); McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining
Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940); American Mfg. Co. v. City of St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919);
U.S. Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321 (1918); Peck &Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S.
165 (1918).
6

In Smith Kline & French Laboratories v. State Tax Commission, 5 State Tax Cas.
S 250-116 (1964), the court states that "The Supreme Court has long recognized that,
at some point in the entire framework of our national business intercourse, interstate
commerce must cease."
7See U.S. Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321, 329 (1918) where the
court clearly explains "A tax upon gross receipts affects each transaction in proportion
to its magnitude and irrespective of whether it is profitable or otherwise .... A tax
upon the net profits has not the same deterrent effect, since it does not arise at all
unless a gain is shown over and above expenses and losses, and the tax cannot be heavy
unless the profits are large."
8 Northwestern State Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
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is noteworthy that the facts of this case are very similar to those in the
InternationalShoe Company case. The Northwestern States Portland Cement Company has its principal place of business in Iowa. It leased an
office in Minnesota for its salesmen and a secretary principally for the
purpose of securing sales. The salesmen solicited orders and relayed them
to the home office in Iowa for acceptance or rejection. If accepted, the
goods were shipped directly from Iowa to the customer in Minnesota.
The facts of the Stockham Valves Co. case are almost identical.9 Both
states levied an apportioned tax on the nei: income of the respective corporations and the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the taxes by a
vote of six to three. The following quotation from the opinion of the
court summarizes the significance of the decision:
We conclude that the net income from the interstate operations of a foreign
corporation may be subjected to state taxation provided the levy is not discriminatory'0 and is properly apportioned to local activities 'within the taxing

State" forming sufficient nexus 12 to support the same. 13

9
The two cases, Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, and
Williams v. Stockham Valves and Fittings Inc. (Chio), are consolidated in the North-

western-Stockham decision.
'o Taxes that discriminate against foreign corporations, by giving local business a
direct commercial advantage have been held an undue burden on interstate commerce

and thus unconstitutional. The question as to whether the Commerce Clause was violated was determined by whether the tax assessed was discriminatory. See Cook, State
Net Income Taxation of interstate Commerce, 42 TAXEs 512, 518 (1964). Interstate
business must pay its fair share of the tax burden in return for the benefits it derives
from the state. If local business has an equal burden, the tax cannot be discriminatory.
See West Publishing Co. v. McColgan, 27 Cal. 2d 705, 166 P.2d 861 (1945); aff'd per
curiam 328 U.S. 823 (1945). Unequal taxation will hinder and discourage interstate
commerce and will be considered discriminatory taxation, Best & Co. v. Marshall, 311
US. 454 (1940).
On the other hand the tax levied can discriminate against local business if the business
in interstate commerce is exempt from local taxation. In this case the interstate business
is earning income within the state upon which it pays no tax while the local business
is earning income within the same state yet, it musi: pay a tax. See Roland, Public Law
86-272 Regulation or Raid, 46 VA. L. Rav. 1172 (1960).
In a study by the Special Subcommittee on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce
of the House Judiciary Committee, released June 15, 1964, it was determined that
there are substantial inequities in the existing tax structures of states among interstate
companies and between interstate and intrastate companies. But as a whole interstate
companies bore less than their fair share of the ta: burden. See, COMMERCE CLEARING
HousE, INTERSTATE INcoME LAW S 300-90 (1964).
11 In the Northwestern decision the court would consider the tax valid only if it was
apportioned to the income earned from activities within the state. Otherwise the
foreign corporation would suffer a multiple tax burden in having more than 100% of
its net income subject to a tax, Hellerstein, An Academician's View of State Taxation
of Interstate Commerce, 16 TAx L. REv. 159 (1961). See also, General Motors Corporation v. Washington, 84 S.Ct. 1564 (1964). Mos: states that tax net income from
interstate commerce have apportionment formulas, but the problem is that each state
may have a different type of formula thereby not eliminating the danger of duplication,

Iyd
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The Spector decision and the Northwestern-Stockbam decision remain
signally important in determining the validity of state taxes particularly
in the distinction drawn. In every situation a tax is burdensome. 14 But
only under certain circumstances is it so onerous that the tax will be invalid as demonstrated in these two cases.
The Northwestern-Stockbam decision in 1959 caused widespread antagonism in interstate business and an agitation for remedial legislation.
Businessmen expressed indignation that a corporation whose only function
in a state is the solicitation of orders should bear the liability of an income
tax. Not many months later, Congress responded with P.L. 86-27215 which
is sometimes referred to as "stopgap" legislation. 1 It specifically exempts
foreign corporations from state taxation of net income earned within the
Cook, supra note 10, at 519. For a discussion of apportionment formulas see Cox, The
NCCUSL Uniform Apportionment Formula, 42 Taxes 530 (1964). However, before
a multiple tax burden can become an issue, the taxpayer must demonstrate that the
formula used for apportionment caused the income of the foreign corporation to be
subject to cumulative tax burdens. Until this was demonstrated, said the court in the
Northwestern case, this question would not be decided. In the case of West Publishing
Co. v. McColgan, 27 supra note 10, at 710, 166 P.2d at 864, the court observed: "Taxation
in one state is not an immunization against taxation in other states."
12 The pertinent part of Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the United States
Constitution reads ". . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Taxpayers in various cases have raised the objection
that the State in question is depriving them of "due process" by taxing the income they
earned from interstate commerce. These interstate businesses feel that there is not a
sufficient relationship or "nexus" between the business and the state to justify the tax.
The courts have decided that the final determination of due process lies with them
and not the Congress as evidenced in State Board of Insurance v. Todd Shipyards Corp.,
370 U.S. 451, 457 (1962) where the court said "Congress of course does not have the
final say as to what constitutes due process under the 14th Amendment." Further, the
courts in their determination of due process have generally held that the states' protection of interstate business in the market is sufficient to justify a tax. See Cook, supra
note 10, at 514, 516; West Publishing Co. v. McColgan, 27 Cal. 2d 705, 166 P.2d 861
(1946); aff'd per curiam, 328 U.S. 823 (1946); International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); International Shoe Co. v. Fontenot, 236 La. 279, 107 So. 2d
640 (1958); cert. den., 358 U.S. 984 (1959); Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlin,
254 U.S. 113 (1920).
13 Northwestern States Portland Cement Company v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 452
(1959).
14 Smith, Kline & French Laboratories v. State Tax Commission, 5 State Tax Cas.
5 250-116 (1964).
15 Imposition of Net Income Tax, 15 U.S.C. § 381 (Supp. V, 1963), hereinafter referred to as P.L. 86-272.
16 See INTERSTATE INCOME LAW op. cit. supra note 10, at 11. Congress only intended
this law to be a temporary solution and called for a study to be made which was receritly released in part. The study merely shows the results of surveys and questionnaires
sent to a sample of businessmen. There were no recommendations in this study. The
recommendations are expected later.
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taxing state if its only activities within the state are the solicitation of
orders for sales of tangible personal property. 17 Such orders must be accepted or rejected outside the taxing state. If approved, the orders may
be filled by shipment from a point outside the state.1 8
A law negating so many United States Supreme Court rulings is certainly to be tested in the courts. Its first significant examination is the
InternationalSboe Company case.
In levying a tax on the net income of International Shoe Company
after the passage of P.L. 86-272, the law was clearly violated. Cocreham
was fully cognizant of this fact but he intended to test the constitutionality of the statute. He questions the authority of Congress in passing P.L.
86-272 on the basis of its plenary power to regulate interstate commerce.
The crux of his objection is based on prior decisions holding a state tax
on net income not oppressive to interstate commerce since it is exacted
only after interstate transactions have terminated. The Collector contends,
therefore, that P.L. 86-272 is unjustifiably restricting certain fundamental,
implicit rights of the states reserved to them by the tenth amendment of
the Federal Constitution. 9 Counsel for one of the amici curiae further
asserts that Congress has forfeited its right to legislate since it has' not done
so for over one hundred and seventy-years. Congress is bound by the
17 There have been many complaints by critics of this statute that the exemptions
are too arbitrary and the important legal terms are not defined clearly. It is felt by
these people that too many interstate businesses wotld change their activities in the state
to meet the exemptions in P.L. 86-272 and thus avoid state tax liability. See Roland,
Public Law 86-272 Regulation or Raid, 46 VA. L. Rtv. 1172, 1180 (1960). See also
Minority Report, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. News, 86th Congress, 1st Sess., p. 2556, (1959).
18 The pertinent provisions of this statute (Title I, Section 101):
"Sec. 101. Imposition of minimum standards. (a) No State, or political subdivision
thereof, shall have power to impose, for any taxable year ending after [September 14,
1959], a net income tax on the income derived within such State by any person from
interstate commerce if the only business activities within such State by or on behalf of
such person during such taxable year are either, or both, of the following: (1) The
solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in such State for sales of
tangible personal property, which orders are sent outside the State for approval or
rejection, and, if approved, are filled by shipment or delivery from a point outside
the State; and (2) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative,
in such State in the name of or for the benefit Of a prospective customer of such
person, if orders by such customer to such person to enable such customer to fill orders
resulting from such solicitation are orders described in paragraph (1)."
19 Two provisions of the United States Constitution are applicable here. First, art. I,
5 10 prohibits the states from taxing exports; and second, the tenth amendment
provides that: "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States. . . ." It is contended in
International Shoe Co. v. Cocreham, 164 So. 2d 314 (La. 1964) by the defendant that
since the States gave up the right to tax exports they impliedly reserved the right to tax
all other areas not specifically delegated to the United States by virtue of the tenth
amendment.
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decisions of the Supreme Court and it cannot now pursue a different
course from that sanctioned by that court.
International Shoe Company, on the contrary, argues that Congress by
virtue of its plenary power can determine if state taxation is an undue
burden or affects the free flow of trade between the states. If Congress
decides it is a hindrance, it can suppress such taxation by passing appropriate legislation. Further under the Supremacy Clause, 20 all state legislation conflicting with federal legislation must be struck down.
The Louisiana Supreme Court recognizes the national ramifications of
this case and therefore decides to go beyond the Supremacy Clause
grounds and deal with the primary issue of the interstate commerce question. Justice McCaleb, in the opinion of the court, agrees with the prior
rulings of the United States Supreme Court holding the tax on income
from interstate commerce to be a valid state tax.21 But Justice McCaleb
further points out that the circumstances were different when these decisions were rendered. Congress had not yet manifested its will by legislating
on the subject of state taxation of interstate commerce, and these decisions
recognize this vital point. 22 As to whether or not Congress has the essential right to speak out, the court incisively states:
Of the many matters presented to the Supreme Court concerning the unconstitutionality of state taxation of activities in interstate commerce, there is none
in which the court has ever suggested that Congress has not retained plenary

power to regulate the activity by prohibiting the imposition of a state tax when
it determines such tax to unduly burden the free flow of such commerce. Indeed, these cases are authority for holding that the Supreme Court has been able
23
to act negatively only because Congress has not heretofore spoken.

Further on in the opinion the court writes:
. .. when Congress speaks, the right of the judiciary to determine whether the
24
burden is undue or not is foreclosed.
20 U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, clause 2, "This Constitution and the Laws of the United States,
which shall be made in pursuance thereof.., shall be the supreme law of the land;
and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby...."
21 The court quoted Roland, op. cit. supra note 10, at 1184, where the author declares
"There is no real basis to dispute that a tax upon net income derived from interstate
commerce is not a tax upon such commerce."
22
See Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U.S. 691 (1882), where the Court said
that Congress and not the Judicial branch has the power to regulate interstate commerce. In Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157, 165 (1953), the
court said that interstate business is not totally immune from taxation ".... absent action
by Congress." In the Nortbwestern-Stockbam decision, supra note 8, the court again

appears anxious to qualify its decision of allowing the state tax, ".

.

. the Congress

meanwhile not having undertaken to regulate taxation of it" meaning, of course, commerce. See also Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946); United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944); and Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S.
292 at 303, 304 (1943).
2
23 164 So. 2d at 319.
41d. at 320.
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Because Congress failed to legislate until the passage of P.L. 86-272 does
not signify forfeiture of the right to do so ".

.

. for once the power is

given it continues as a legislative power and may be exerted at any time
S.. Nor does the exertion of judicial power by negative action,... cre25
ate an estoppel against subsequent contrary legislative action."
Since Congress indubitably has the power to regulate interstate commerce it inevitably follows that it has, along with this power, the right
to determine whether the burden of a state tax is unduly restrictive to
interstate commerce. Upon so finding, Congress then has the inherent right
to suppress it.2 6 Based on this cogently reasoned opinion, the Louisiana
Supreme Court upholds P.L. 86-272.27

Only one month later, the Smith, Kline 6- French28 case was decided in
the Oregon Tax Court. Here again, the con;titutionality of P.L. 86-272 is
assailed but in this decision the court conc:ludes that the Federal Statute
is unconstitutional. Mr. Justice Gunnar in his opinion points out that the
subject matter of P.L. 86-272 is not interstatce commerce. Net income from
interstate commerce, he elucidates in his rationale, arises after the commercial transactions have ended and, therefore, is not interstate commerce
per se. Therefore, P.L. 86-272, which limits the taxation of this net income,
is not concerned with the subject of interstate commerce, but rather with
the end results of such commerce. Perhaps then, the plenary power of
Congress to regulate interstate commerce has reached a limit. If Congress
attempts to surpass this boundary by prohibiting state taxation of interstate
29
commerce its authority must terminate.
25

Id. at 321.

26

The United States Supreme Court has in various cases allowed Congress the discretion as to what affects interstate commerce, and thus call for Congressional regulation.
See Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922); National Labor Relations Board v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1936). In South Carolina State Highway Department v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 189 (1938), the Court observes that it is
a Congressional function and not a Judicial function to determine what is a burden
on interstate commerce and what would be appropriate regulation of such a burden
even if such regulation required state and local interests to yield a good deal of
power to national interests.
27 1n a recent decision P.L. 86-272 was also upheld. See Ciba Pharmaceutical Products,
Inc. v. State Tax Commission, Cir. Ct. Cole County Mo., Nov. 28, 1962, appeal filed
Mo. Sup. Ct. Feb. 3, 1963, 2 Mo. State Tax Rep. (CCH) S 200-384, summarized 2 Mo.

State Tax Rep. (CCH) S200-385.
28
Smith, Kline & French Laboratories v. State Tax Commission, 5 State Tax Cases
S 250-116 (Ore. Tax 1964).
29The Court in McGoldrick v. Berind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 46, 47
(1940) said that there were taxes that ".... affect interstate commerce, which neverthe-

less fall short of the regulation of the commerce which the Constitution leaves to
Congress."
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Fear of destruction of state sovereignty 30 is the principal motivation in
reaching this decision. According to Justice Gunnar, this catastrophe can
result if Congress transgresses beyond the confines specifically delegated
to it by.the Constitution.A But his reasoning is faulty when he declares:
If, as interstate commerce Congress can prohibit a state tax on net income derived from interstate commerce, then, Congress can prohibit all state taxation
under its broad power to regulate intrastate affairs affecting interstate commerce32

Justice Gunnar fails to realize that it is not the purpose of Congress in
passing P.L. 86-272 to deprive the states of any revenue. It is designed to
protect foreign corporations from inequities that have resulted from the
variety of tax systems devised in the many states. This certainly does not
indicate that Congress has as its objective further legislation that will
completely destroy the states' power to tax.
It remains to be seen what direction this interesting controversy will
take. With two such sharply conflicting opinions there is a compelling
need for resolution and clarification in a higher forum. In addition Congress in its study of the problem, which is still in process, may decide to
amend or completely replace P.L. 86-272 thus rendering the ultimate
question moot. However, because of the courts' hesitance to interfere with
the acknowledged plenary power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, it is likely that this statute will remain in force unaltered.
Dennis Carlin
30 Smith, Kline & French Laboratories v. State Tax Commission, 5 State Tax Cases
250-116 (Ore. Tax 1964), the Oregon Tax Court writes "Stripped of the power to
tax, the Sovereignty of states is a hollow shell."
31 Mr. Justice Gunnar also makes mention of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's words in
Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946), where he points out interstate commerce
should be regulated but not at the expense of state sovereignity.
. 82 Smith, Kline & French Laboratories v. State Tax Commission, 5 State Tax Cas.
250-116 (Ore. Tax 1964).

JURISDICTION-TORTS-APPLICATION OF "SINGLE ACT"
STATUTE BY FORUM STATE WHEN ACTUAL
DAMAGE OCCURRED IN SISTER STATE
Estwing Manufacturing Company, an Illinois corporation, manufactured
hammers marked unbreakable and shipped them, f.o.b. Rockford, Illinois,
to the defendant, Walker's Minerals, for subsequent resale. The dealer's
purchases were made by mail order using Estwing's catalogue. Plaintiff's

